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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This suit arises from the injury of Armando Olmos on October 9, 2008. Mr. Olmos was 
injured when his hand was pulled into the junction between two potato conveyors. The 
conveyors were manufactured and sold by Spudnik Equipment Company, LLC ("Spudnik"). 
At the time he was injured, Mr. Olmos was an employee of Grant 4-D Farms, and entitled 
to benefits pursuant to Idaho's workers' compensation code. Appellant Liberty Northwest 
Insurance Company ("Liberty") was Grant 4-D Farms' worker's compensation surety. Liberty 
paid out approximately $214,221 in benefits. 
Liberty retained an expert who determined that the design of the conveyors was 
defective, and the warnings were inadequate. As authorized under Idaho Code § 72-223, Liberty 
filed suit against Spudnik to recover the amounts it had paid out in benefits. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
The Complaint in this matter was filed on February 1, 2010. Spudnik entered an 
appearance on April 26, 2010, and filed its Answer on August 19, 2010. On September 26, 2011, 
Spudnik filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence, which Motion was denied 
by an Order issued on February 15, 2012. 
In the interim, Spudnik filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 2012. A 
hearing was conducted on March 19, 2012. On March 12, 2012, the District Court issued an 
Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. A Judgment was entered that same day. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Armando Olmos was an employee of Grant 4-D Farms on October 9, 2008, when he was 
injured in an incident involving Spudnik conveyors. See generally R. 140; R. 143; R. 358 
(Deposition of Gerardo Saucedo ("Saucedo Depo. "), p. 14, LL 10-21 ); R. 360 (Saucedo Depo. P. 
20, LL 13-18). 
At the time of the incident, Mr. Olmos was assisting in piling potatoes in a cellar during 
potato harvest. See generally R. 442 (Deposition of Thomas Groat ("Groat Depo."), pp. 106-107) 
(incident was toward the end of the potato harvest); R. 470-71 (Deposition of Duane R. Grant 
("Grant Depo."), pp. 34-38) (generally describing incident and work). To summarize, however, 
the potatoes would be brought to a hopper ("clodhopper") outside the cellar, and moved into the 
cellar and piled via conveyors, to a "tub" and then into a piler that would pile the potatoes. R. 
471 (Grant Depo. p. 36, LL 1-15); R. 381-82 (Deposition of Richard Gill, Ph.D. ("Gill Depo."), 
p. 26, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 18). In this instance, the Farm was not using an "eliminator" to separate 
clods, rocks and other debris from the potatoes, but was using farm hands ("clod pickers") to 
manually separate out the clods. R. 471 (Grant Depo., p. 37, L. 19 - p. 38, L. 12). As Dr. Gill 
noted: "[T]he job of the laborers there with the conveyor belts. It's to stand right alongside them, 
to reach their hand into the conveyor belts, manipulate the product, the potatoes, to get non-
product; rocks, dirt clods, vines, and remove them." R. 385 (Gill Depo., p. 42, L. 25 - p. 43, L. 
4). 
While the belts would normally run in the same direction, because the conveyors used 
three-phase electric motors, "depending on how the phases of the power are matched up with the 
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phases of the motor wiring, the motors will tum one direction or the other. ... " R. 382 (Gill 
Depo., p. 31, LL 11-15). Three phase motors will run equally well either direction, and so the 
direction the motor will rotate is dependent on which power wire is hooked up to which terminal 
on the motor. R. 472 (Grant Depo., p. 41, LL 13-22). Simply rearranging or shortening the line 
of conveyors could result in the direction of one of the conveyor motors to reverse. See genera/Iv 
R. 472-73 (Grant Depo., pp. 41-44 (explaining in detail how the reversal can occur). Mr. Grant 
noted that "[i]t's a common problem. It's been a common problem since conveyors were used." 
R. 473 (Grant Depo., p. 44, LL 19-23). See also R. 360 (Saucedo Depo., p. 22, L. 23 - p. 23, L. 
13) (also noting that reversal of the direction of the motor is a common problem). In this 
instance, the Farm had removed a conveyor to shorten the line just prior to Mr. Olmos' injury. R. 
359 (Saucedo Depo., p. 17, L. 23 - p. 18, L. 11 ); R. 360 (Saucedo Depo., p. 21, LI. 4-15). 
Mr. Olmos' duties that day were to remove garbage, rocks, and other unwanted materials 
from the conveyors. R. 359 (Saucedo Depo., p. 16, LL 15-17). Just prior to the incident, Mr. 
Olmos' had assisted with moving a conveyor. R. 359 (Saucedo Depo., p. 16, L. 19 - p. 17, L. 2). 
After the conveyor had been moved, Mr. Saucedo started the conveyors running, and then went 
back into the potato cellar to check that the conveyor belts were centered. R. 360 (Saucedo 
Depo., p. 20, LL 4-18). At that time he heard yelling and screaming, and immediately shut down 
the system, ran back into the cellar and saw Mr. Olmos' hand caught. Id. Mr. Olmos' could not 
explain to Mr. Saucedo how it happened, but when the conveyor was turned on, his hand got 
pulled between two rollers. See generally R. 360-61 (Saucedo Depo., pp. 21 - 24). 
The testimony of Mr. Grant, the farm's owner, and Mr. Saucedo, Mr. Olmos' supervisor, 
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both established that all of the conveyors used at the time and place Mr. Olmos was injured were 
manufactured by Spudnik. R. 478 (Deposition of Duane Grant ("Grant Depo. "), p. 66, LL 18-
19); R. 363 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, LL 21-23). In addition, the documentation shows that the 
conveyors were sold by Spudnik to Grant 4-D Farms. See, e.g., R. 348-349 and Augmented 
Record. Thus, Spudnik was not only the manufacturer, but also the product seller of the 
equipment involved in the incident. 
Plaintiff also presented evidence that the design of the equipment was defective. In this 
instance, where two conveyors were connected, the belts were running toward one another, 
creating a "nip point," that could grab anything that got into space or junction between the belts 
and rollers, causing an injury. See generally, R. 384-85 (Deposition of Richard Gill, Ph.D. "Gill 
Depo."), p. 39, L. 22 - p. 40, L. 7; p. 40, L. 19 -p. 41, L. 7; p. 42, LL 1-6). The risk of this type 
of injury was foreseeable to Spudnik, but not open and obvious to the lay person. R. 385 (Gill 
Depo., p. 40, LL 21-24; p. 42, L. 24 p. 43, L. 15), R. 387 (Gill Depo., p. 51, LL 20-21), and R. 
393 (Gill Depo., p. 75, LL 6-9). 
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Gill, found that the conveyors, as designed, did not meet industry 
standards. R. 391-92 (Gill Depo., p. 67, L. 15 -p. 68, L. 11). He testified: 
In my opinion, it [the conveyor] falls short in terms of the 
proximate cause of this accident and that is ASME B 20.1 
specifically alerts to you and warns you about guarding and it 
draws attention to guards and safety features where conveyors are 
connected and joined so we all know that this is a problem and yet, 
we have here conveyors that are common for their every day use, 
moved around, interchanged, reconnected and yet there's no 
guards or safety features. There's no guards for a foreseeable in-
running nip point. There is no safety feature like an emergency 
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stop. There's nothing different about the junction of these two 
conveyors than anywhere else on the conveyor. 
R. 391-92 (Gill Depo., p. 67, L. 20 - p. 68, L. 6) (italics added). In other words, "[i]t lacks the 
guarding for a foreseeable in-running nip point and not removal by Safety by Design to eliminate 
that possibility or to mitigate the severity of the hazard." R. 392 (Gill Depo., p. 68, LL 9-11). 
The warning labels on the equipment were also deficient. The equipment lacked any 
warning labels "of an in-running nip point at the location where the hazard existed." R. 384 (Gill 
Depo., p. 38, LL 4-23). See also R. 390 (Gill Depo., p. 63, LL 17-19) (preferable to post the 
warning proximate to the hazard). Although there were warning labels elsewhere, "they were 
insufficient for the hazard that existed." R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 39, LL 9-10). Dr. Gill further 
testified that even had labels been present, it would have been insufficient to protect against the 
hazard. R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 39, LL 11-17). The manual for the conveyors was also inadequate 
and did not contain warnings as required by industry standards. R. 391 (Gill Depo., p. 66, L. 1 -
p. 67, L. 14). 
Defendant admitted in its briefing and at the summary judgment hearing that working 
with the equipment was dangerous-in fact, too dangerous for someone of Mr. Olmos' age to be 
operating. R. 140; Summary Judgment Tr. p. 50, L. 20 p. 51, L. 8. Defendant failed to 
introduce any evidence to contest Dr. Gill's opinions and conclusions. See, e.g. R. 527 (District 
Court struck report prepared by Spudnik's expert Bruce Main). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the Respondent? 
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II. Did the District Court err by not granting summary judgment to the Appellant? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. BURDENS OF PROOF AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate "if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612, 617 (2001). Nevertheless, 
the burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Id. See also 
Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 793, 215 P.3d 505, 513 (2009). 
"Therefore, the burden never shifts to the non-movant to oppose the motion if the movant fails to 
raise the issue in the first place." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 793. 
"If the defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of 
material facts exists with regard to an element of the plaintiffs case, the plaintiff must establish 
the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., 
128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P .2d 67, 70 (1996). "Of course, a party seeking summary judgment 
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, 
and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
The danger for the defendant in such a case is that "[a] motion for summary judgment allows the 
court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that 
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the court will find against it," and grant summary judgment to the non-moving party. Harwood, 
136 Idaho at 677. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
SPUD NICK. 
The District Court concluded that because "a jury could potentially decide that the 
maintenance and/or alterations to the tables was [sic] the proximate cause of Olmos' injuries," 
the inability to identify the specific conveyor tables required the entry of summary judgment. R. 
536-37. This finding was, in tum, premised on the Court determining that there had been 
modifications to the tables. R. 535. The District Court reasoned that "whether the design of 
Spudnik's conveyor tables, the modifications made to the tables ... or Grant 4-D Farms' 
maintenance upon the conveyors caused the injury cannot be ascertained without some 
identification of which tables were involved." R. 535. The District Court also stated that the 
issue of whether there were adequate warnings could not be resolved without proof of when the 
tables involved were purchased, and their condition when they left Spudnik's hands and at the 
time of the injury. R. 536. 
The court erred, however, by presuming, without proof or evidence, that alterations or 
lack of maintenance could have caused the injury. The court also made factual errors relevant to 
the issue of whether there existed genuine issues of material fact. 
1. Summary Judgment Standards For Product Defect Cases. 
"To prevail over a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff who alleges 
product liability based on either negligence or strict liability must establish that there are material 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 7 
issues of fact as to (1) injury, (2) whether the injury was proximately caused by a defect, and (3) 
whether the defect existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer." Tuttle v. 
Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 149-50, 868 P.2d 473, 477-78 (1994). Per the Idaho 
Products Liability Act: 
When a product seller proves, by the preponderance of the 
evidence, that an alteration or modification of the product by the 
claimant, or by a party other than the claimant or the product seller 
has proximately caused the claimant's harm, the claimant's 
damages shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the 
extent that the alteration or modification was a proximate cause of 
the harm. 
I.C. § 6-1405(4). See also, Tuttle, 125 Idaho at 149. The language in§ 6-1405(4) creates a jury 
question, unless the court is able to rule as a matter of law that the facts are undisputed and lead 
to but one reasonable conclusion. Tuttle, 125 Idaho at 149. However, even if misuse, alteration 
or modification of the product occurred, such conduct does not necessarily present an absolute 
bar to the manufacturer's liability. Tuttle, 125 Idaho at 150. "To properly grant a manufacturer's 
motion for summary judgment, the district court still must rule as a matter of law that the product 
was not defective and that, if defective, such defect nonetheless did not proximately cause the 
injury." Id. (underline added). 
2. It Is Undisputed That Mr. Olmos Suffered An Injury. 
It is not disputed that Mr. Olmos suffered an injury. See generally R. 140; R. 143; R. 358 
(Deposition of Gerardo Saucedo ("Saucedo Depo. "), p. 14, LI. 10-21 ); R. 360 (Saucedo Depo. P. 
20, LL 13-18). 
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3. The Undisputed Evidence Was That Mr. Olmos Injury Occurred While 
Using a Spudnik Product. 
The record is also clear that the equipment involved with Mr. Olmos' injury was 
manufactured by Spudnik. At the end of his deposition, Mr. Olmos' direct supervisor, Gerardo 
Saucedo, was questioned about the brand of conveyors being used: 
Q. Gerardo, the other-the conveyors that were being used 
that day, were they Spudnik conveyors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There weren't any L&L conveyors there that day? 
A. No. 
R. 363-64 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, L. 21 - p. 33). Duane Grant, the owner of Grant 4-D Farms 
where Mr. Olmos was employed, also testified that in 2008 the Farm kept its Spudnik conveyors 
"isolated" from its L&L manufactured conveyors. R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 
15). He further stated that: "My recollection is the conveyor system that was being used in this 
case was all Spudnik." R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 18-19). See also R. 191 (investigator 
identified the conveyor tables as manufactured by Spudnik and purchased at a farm action in 
March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young). 
4. The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That The Injury Was Due to Defects in the 
Manufacturer's Design and Warnings. 
It is also undisputed that the injury was proximately caused by design and warning 
defects with the equipment. As noted in the Statement of Facts, in this instance, the belts of two 
conveyors were running toward one another, creating a "nip point," that could grab anything that 
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got into the junction or space between the belts and rollers, causing an injury. See generally, R. 
384-85 (Gill Depo.), p. 39, L. 22 - p. 40, L. 7; p. 40, L. 19 - p. 41, L. 7; p. 42, LL 1-6). Dr. Gill 
testified that a "nip point" is not an open and obvious hazard, but "is a functionally hidden 
hazard to people and the potential severity of injury is high so it becomes a significant risk that 
needs to be addressed." R. 388 (Gill Depo., p. 52, LL 1-4). See also R. 385-86 (Gill Depo., p. 43, 
L. 12 - p. 45, L. 25). 
Dr. Gill testified that it is best to design a product to eliminate a hazard or remove the 
operator from the hazard. R. 386 (Gill Depo., p. 47, LL 19-25). If a product could not be 
designed to eliminate the hazard, the next best thing was to provide guarding-e.g., "put a 
barrier between the person and the nip point where they can't reach into the nip point when 
they're walking around on the surface of the conveyors or sitting." R. 388 (Gill Depo., p. 54, LL 
18-20). An example of this would be the guard that Grant 4-D Farms had developed for their 
conveyors following a second similar incident in 2010. R. 388 (Gill Depo., p. 54, LL 21-23); R. 
478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, LL 15-25). See also R. 480 (Grant Depo., p. 74, L. 20 - p. 75, L. 24) 
(describing the guard that Grant Farms developed and installed on the conveyors). Finally, the 
least effective method to protect against the hazard would be to provide a warning, i.e., 
"persuasion control." R. 389 (p. 56, LL 7-18; p. 57, LL 13-15). 
Dr. Gill did not think it was practicable to design a conveyor that would not have 
operators around it. R. 388 (Gill Depo., p. 52, LL 8-13). He faulted Spudnik's design, though, for 
not protecting against inadvertent contact of the nip point. R. 388 (Gill Depo., p. 55, LI. 7-14). 
Dr. Gill noted that ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) standard B 20.1 was 
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applicable to the conveyors in this case. R. 391 (Gill Depo., p. 67, LL 15-17). He also indicated 
that the Spudnik conveyors did not meet the industry standards, stating: 
In my opinion, it [the conveyor] falls short in terms of the 
proximate cause of this accident and that is ASME B 20. l 
specifically alerts to you and warns you about guarding and it 
draws attention to guards and safety features where conveyors are 
connected and joined so we all know that this is a problem and yet, 
we have here conveyors that are common for their every day use, 
moved around, interchanged, reconnected and yet there's no 
guards or safety features. There's no guards for a foreseeable in-
running nip point. There is no safety feature like an emergency 
stop. There's nothing different about the junction of these two 
conveyors than anywhere else on the conveyor. 
R. 391-92 (Gill Depo., p. 67, L. 20 - p. 68, L. 6). In other words, "[i]t lacks the guarding for a 
foreseeable in-running nip point and not removal by Safety by Design to eliminate that 
possibility or to mitigate the severity of the hazard." R. 392 (Gill Depo., p. 68, LL 9-11). 
Dr. Gill opined that "the hazard was created back in the design of this equipment and this 
was the hazard actually being realized in realtime was when the two conveyor[s] were counter-
rotating coming into each other." R. 392 (Gill Depo., p. 71, LL 12-16). He also said, "[t]he cause 
was the defective design in the equipment," and "[t]he primary cause, if you go back to fault-free 
analysis far enough, is designing a piece of equipment with an in-running nip point that has no 
guard and no Safety by Design and virtually no Persuasion Control." R. 393 (Gill Depo., p. 75, 
LI. 6-13). 
Even turning to the least effective protection-providing a warning-the Spudnik 
products were defective. Specifically, the equipment lacked any warning labels "of an in-running 
nip point at the location where the hazard existed." R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LI. 4-23). See also 
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R. 390 (Gill Depo., p. 63, LL 17-19) (preferable to post the warning proximate to the hazard). 
Although there were warning labels elsewhere, "they were insufficient for the hazard that 
existed." R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 39, LL 9-10). Dr. Gill further testified that even had labels been 
present, it would have been insufficient to protect against the hazard. R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 39, 
LL 11-17). The manual for the conveyors was also inadequate and did not contain warnings as 
required by industry standards. R. 391 (Gill Depo., p. 66, L. 1 - p. 67, L. 14). When asked how 
he knew there were no such labels or warnings present on the equipment, Dr. Gill responded that 
his information was "based on the video [of the Spudnik conveyors], the photographs, and the 
Spudnik manual because the manual tells you what warning labels are on the equipment and 
there's none for that." R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 10-12) (underline added). 
In short, it is uncontroverted that Mr. Olmos was injured by Spudnik equipment, due to a 
design defect and inadequate warnings. Dr. Gill testified extensively concerning such defects. 
Spudnik did not introduce any admissible evidence that would refute or call into question any of 
Dr. Gill's opinions. 1 Because the defect was in the design and warnings provided by Spudnik-
the manufacturer and seller of the equipment-"the defect existed at the time the product left the 
control of the manufacturer." Tuttle, 125 Idaho at 149-50. Per the holding in Tuttle, Plaintiff 
established the three elements required to overcome a motion for summary judgment in a product 
liability case. See Tuttle, 125 Idaho at 149-50. 
1 The District Court struck as inadmissible a report prepared for Spudnik by Bruce Main, which purported to address 
Dr. Gill's initial report. R. 527. 
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5. There Is No Evidence That Any Modifications or The Condition of the 
Equipment Contributed to Mr. Olmos' Injury. 
The District Court held that Plaintiff had the additional burden of showing "the absence 
of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant." R. 
534 (quoting Farmer v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 747, 553 P.2d 1306, 1311 (1976)). 
The District Court concluded: "But whether the design of Spudnik's conveyor tables, the 
modifications made to the tables (whether by Grant 4-D Farms, the previous owner, or Spudnik), 
or Grant 4-D Farms' maintenance upon the conveyors caused the injury cannot be ascertained 
without some identification of which tables were involved." R. 535. The District Court's 
conclusion is incorrect. Plaintiff has produced credible evidence that the proximate cause of Mr. 
Olmos' injury was a design defect that was independent of any one specific piece of equipment. 
There was no other evidence before the District Court. 
As discussed in more detail above, Dr. Gill testified that the defective design was the 
proximate cause of Mr. Olmos' injury, and further noted that the warnings were deficient. Dr. 
Gill has specifically spoken of the lack of guards to prevent someone from reaching into where 
the nip point hazard existed. There is no expert testimony stating that the design was not 
defective or the design was not the proximate cause of Mr. Olmos' injury. There is no testimony 
or evidence whatsoever that the Spudnik conveyors had any guards. When testifying about the 
guards that Grant 4-D Farms later developed and installed, Mr. Grant indicated that Spudnik did 
not offer guards. See R. 478 (p. 64, L. 15 -p. 65, L. 10). 
It is uncontroverted that the equipment lacked warnings when it left the factory. As Dr. 
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Gill noted in his testimony, Spudnik's owner's manual listed what warning labels were on the 
equipment, and it did not include one for a "nip point" hazard. See R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 
10-12). Defendant did not refute this or offer any evidence that the equipment was manufactured 
or sold with such warnings. 
Dr. Gill also addressed whether the condition of the equipment could have contributed to 
the injury. He testified: "I don't believe the condition [of the equipment] was proximate to the 
incident .... " R. 383-84 (Gill Depo., p. 35, L. 25 - p. 36, L. 1 ). He went on to state: 
I have a general knowledge of the condition of the equipment 
based on the video that was taken shortly after the accident and 
based on that video and the discovery material I've read I've made 
the determination that the condition of the equipment was not 
proximate and didn't investigate it further. 
R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 36, LL 11-16). In this regard, it is notable that Mr. Groat, who performed 
the initial investigation for Liberty Northwest, indicated that there had not been a mechanical 
malfunction or breakdown. See R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, LL 1-10). In fact, the Farm 
continued to use the equipment after the incident. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 107, LL 1-10). Thus, 
there is no evidence of a mechanical malfunction that may have caused or contributed to the 
equipment. 
Although the District Court was concerned about modifications to the equipment may 
have contributed to the accident, the record indicates that the modifications made by Grant 4-G 
Farms were after Mr. Olmos' injury. The guards developed by the Farm were not installed until 
after a similar incident in 2010. R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, LL 5-19). The adapters to allow the 
Farm to use L&L conveyors with Spudnik conveyors, and different models of Spudnik 
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conveyors together, where not installed until the winter of 2009. R. 475 (Grant Depo., p. 54, LL 
1-4); R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 65, LL 21-25). The phase reversers that the Farm eventually 
installed, to allow the direction of the motors to be changed, were not installed until the winter of 
2009-over a year after Mr. Olmos' injury. See R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 24-25). While 
some of the phase reversers were already installed when the Farm purchased the conveyors, Mr. 
Grant believed that the phase reversers had been installed by Spudnik. See R. 475 (Grant Depo., 
p. 55, LL 7-14). Mr. Grant testified that the Farm had modified the plugs on the conveyors so 
they are uniform, but the testimony does not indicate when the modifications took place. See R. 
475 (Grant Depo., p. 54, L. 17 - p. 55, L. 6). See also R. 191 (investigator's report indicating 
that there were no modifications to the conveyor table); R. 427 (Groat Depo., p. 44, L. 21 - p. 
45, L. 13). 
In any event, there is no evidence that any of the modifications would have caused or 
contributed to Mr. Olmos' injury. Spudnik did not provide any expert testimony to explain or 
justify how or why the modifications may have contributed to the accident. Dr. Gill's testimony 
that the injury was the proximate result of a defective design, and that the warnings were 
deficient, stands unchallenged. Dr. Gill's testimony that the condition of the equipment was not 
relevant to the cause of the accident is likewise uncontroverted. 
Plaintiff contends that because Mr. Olmos was an older worker, who possibly had 
disabilities (for which he would have been protected against discrimination in the workplace 
under both Federal and State law), it was "abnormal use" of the equipment to have Mr. Olmos 
working around the conveyors. See R. 172. However, this argument does not describe an 
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"abnormal use" of the equipment, but instead describes physical attributes of the person using 
the equipment. Since the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination against 
disabled workers, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112, Defendant is essentially arguing that the only way to 
safely operate its machinery is to violate Federal law. Moreover, Dr. Gill testified that farm 
workers that were elderly and/or had disabilities were part of the foreseeable user group for this 
type of equipment. R. 379 (Gill Depo., p. 18, L. 15-p. 19, L. 19). Dr. Gill also stated that why 
Mr. Olmos had his hand on or near the nip point was not relevant to his analysis that the 
equipment was defectively designed. R. 393 (Gill Depo., p. 72, LI. 3-19). "In this case, is it 
foreseeable that someone's hands would be inside[?] and the answer is not only is it foreseeable, 
that's the nature of the tasks they perform, is putting their hands inside the rails and on to the 
area where the conveyor belt is." R. 393 (Gill Depo., p. 73, LL 8-12). 
To sum up, the defects identified by Dr. Gill existed irrespective of the specific 
equipment involved. Defendant has not offered any evidence to deny this. There are no affidavits 
from Defendant's expert indicating that the equipment, as designed, would not have had a nip 
point hazard. There are no affidavits from Defendant showing that the equipment was 
manufactured, or sold by Spudnik to Grant 4-D Farms, with warning labels, safety guards or 
barriers, or otherwise designed and manufactured in such a way that the hazard was eliminated or 
mitigated. Defendant has failed to offer any evidence that suggests that the accident could have 
only been due to a subsequent mechanical defect. It was foreseeable that an elderly and/or 
disabled worker may have been using the equipment, and that workers using the equipment 
would put their hands inside the rails and near the nip point hazard. 
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6. The District Court's Decision is Not Supported by the Facts. 
The District Court's decision was premised on the assumption that the conveyors had 
been modified at the time of Mr. Olmos' injury. R. 535. The District Court stated that "Grant 4-
D Farms modified the bolt connection patterns between the conveyors, adapted the plugs, and 
added phase reversers onto every conveyor." R. 532. However, as discussed in more detail 
above, the modifications noted by the Court did not occur until after Mr. Olmos' injury. 
Moreover, as also noted earlier, there was no evidence of a mechanical malfunction. The only 
evidence before the District Court was that Mr. Olmos' injury was the result of a design defect. 
As discussed earlier, even if misuse, alteration or modification of the product occurred, 
such conduct does not necessarily present an absolute bar to the manufacturer's liability. Tuttle, 
125 Idaho at 150. "To properly grant a manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, the district 
court still must rule as a matter of law that the product was not defective and that, if defective, 
such defect nonetheless did not proximately cause the injury." Id. (underline added). Based on 
the evidence from Dr. Gill, the District Court could not rule as a matter of law that the product 
was not defective. Defendant never offered any evidence that a farm laborer using new, unaltered 
conveyors could not inadvertently come in contact with the nip point hazard. Accordingly, it was 
error for the District Court to grant summary judgment. 
7. The District Court's Dismissal for Spoliation Was Not Supported by Law. 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment was based upon Liberty Northwest 
being able to identify by serial number only one of the two conveyor tables that was in use at the 
time and place of Mr. Olmos' accident. In other words, summary judgment was based on an 
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allegation of spoliation. The Court's decision was legally incorrect for several reasons. 
First, Plaintiff had generally identified the tables involved. Plaintiff noted in its Answers 
to Interrogatories: 
[I]t has been identified that the conveyors in use were of Spudnik 
manufacture, and at least one of the conveyors specifically 
involved in the accident was Spudnik conveyor 1205-96-877. This 
conveyor had the number 2721 painted on the side. Another 
conveyor that may have been involved was painted with the 
number 5505-1 or 5505-2. The remaining Spudnik conveyors in 
use at the time were believed to have been purchased together. 
R. 97 and 201. Spudnik had also been provided with a "General Investigation Report" of an 
investigation conducted by the Company shortly after the accident which indicated that the 
conveyor tables were manufactured by Spudnik, that one of the tables known "for sure" to be 
involved had the number 2721 painted on its side, a serial number of 877, and model number of 
1205-96. R. 161 and 191. That same report indicated that "[t]hese particular tables were 
purchased at a farm auction in March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young which went out of 
business." R. 161and191. See also R. 426 (Deposition of Thomas Groat ("Groat Depo."), p. 42, 
LL 15-25). The receipt/purchase orders for this purchase are in the record. R. 131-132; R. 348-
349; Augmented Record. These contain serial numbers for all of the tables purchased together. 
This was at least enough information for Defendant to have inspected the tables if it had wanted 
to do so. 
Second, identification of the specific tables by serial number was irrelevant. A product 
liability case "may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence of a malfunction of the 
product and the absence of evidence of abnormal use and the absence of evidence of reasonable 
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secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant." Farmer v. Int'l Harvester 
Co., 97 Idaho 742, 747-48, 553 P.2d 1306, 1311-12 (1976). As discussed in more detail above, 
Dr. Gill testified that the proximate cause of the accident was the design of the equipment-
specifically, the lack of guards-and that the equipment did not adequately warn of hazards. It is 
uncontroverted that Spudnik conveyors were manufactured without guards and did not include 
warnings about nip-point hazards. Dr. Gill also testified that the condition of the equipment was 
not relevant to the cause of the accident. This evidence is uncontroverted. Thus, because it was a 
design hazard common to all of Spudnik's conveyors, it is not necessary that all of the Spudnik 
conveyors in use at the time of the accident be specifically identified by serial number. 
Third, dismissal is not an appropriate remedy. "The doctrine of spoliation of evidence 
'provides that when a party with a duty to preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an 
inference arises that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party." Ada County 
Highway Dist. V. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008) 
(quoting Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003)). Accord, 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999); Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 
806, 816, 907 P.2d 783, 793 (1995). In other words, even if Defendant could show spoliation, its 
remedy would be a favorable inference at trial, not dismissal. 
Fourth, in order for the doctrine of spoliation to apply, there must have been a duty to 
preserve the evidence. Although the Idaho courts have not addressed the issue of when the duty 
arises, courts appear to agree that the litigation must be foreseeable. See, e.g., Johnson v. Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1162 (101h Cir. 2011) (holding that no duty arose because of the 
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lack of foreseeability). In this case, the incident was on October 9, 2008-a Thursday.2 Liberty's 
investigator called Mr. Grant the following Monday, October 13, 2008, to set up an appointment 
to conduct an inspection. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 32, LL 23-25). At that time he was told by Mr. 
Grant that the Farm was still using the equipment. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 33, LL 2-4). 
Normally, Mr. Groat would have conducted the inspection the next day, but he already had 
appointments the next day, so he scheduled to visit the Farm on Wednesday, October 15, 2008. 
R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 33, LL 5-9). When he arrived from Boise on the 151h to conduct his 
initial investigation, the conveyor tables were not set up and in operation, because it had snowed; 
nevertheless, Mr. Groat interviewed some of the employees that day. See R. 426 (Groat Depo., p. 
41, Ll. 17-25) and 437 (Groat Depo. P. 85, LL 12-21). Mr. Groat returned to the farm on October 
20, 2008, to videotape the equipment in operation and continue his investigation. See generally 
R. 425. 
Normally, if there had been a machinery breakdown or malfunction, Liberty would 
instruct its insured to secure the equipment. However, in this instance, Mr. Groat was not made 
aware of a machinery malfunction or breakdown, and he did not conclude that there had been a 
malfunction or breakdown of the machinery when he conducted his investigation. R. 442 (Groat 
Depo., p. 104, L. 8 - p. 106, L. 10). Moreover, the Farm continued to use its equipment to 
complete the potato harvest. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, L. 16 -p. 107, L. 16). Thus, it was not 
foreseeable to Liberty Northwest at the time of the incident that the equipment needed to be 
preserved for a later suit; nor did Liberty Northwest have possession of the equipment. 
2 Although it apparently did not get into the record, the incident was not reported to Liberty Northwest until 
Saturday, October 11, 2008. 
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Fifth, there are absolutely no facts to support a finding or inference that Liberty 
Northwest "intentionally destroyed" the equipment. The uncontroverted testimony is that the 
Farm continued to use the equipment in the days following the incident and had already moved 
the equipment by the time Mr. Grout had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Grant or conduct his 
inspection. 
Finally, the District Court should have considered that notwithstanding the limited 
number of conveyors that could have been involved, Spudnik has never made an effort to inspect 
any of them. See Summary Judgment Tr. p. 38, L. 24 - p. 39, L. 6 (noting that Spudnik has 
never requested to inspect the equipment); Motion to Dismiss Tr., p. 25, LL 6-12 (noting that 
Spudnik has the opportunity to inspect the equipment). A similar issue arose in Bromley v. 
Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999), where a plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence 
from a gunsmith concerning a shotgun that had misfired. The court criticized the plaintiff's 
expert for submitting theories why the shotgun may have malfunctioned, but never having taken 
the gun apart or performed anything other than an external examination. Bromley, 132 Idaho at 
811. 
Spudnik does much the same thing here. It argues that modifications to the equipment 
and/or maintenance may have contributed to the accident without ever having bothered to inspect 
any of the conveyors. Moreover, even though it manufactured the equipment, and presumably 
has access to the same or similar conveyors, it failed to introduce any admissible evidence that 
the accident could not have happened using unmodified equipment or equipment in good repair. 
Essentially, Spudnik is asking the Court to dismiss a case based on speculation or conjecture that 
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a modification or lack of maintenance may have contributed to the accident, even though the 
evidence shows that the design was defective, the warnings inadequate, and that there were no 
mechanical problems with the conveyors at the time of the accident. This Court should reject 
Defendant's argument, reverse the summary judgment, and remand this matter to the District 
Court. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF. 
As noted above, "[a] motion for summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues 
placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against 
it," and grant summary judgment to the non-moving party. Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677. A 
district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed 
its own motion with the court. Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 793, 215 
P.3d 505, 513 (2009). 
In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Plaintiff had asked the District Court to grant summary judgment to Plaintiff based on the 
only evidence being that the proximate cause of Mr. Olmos' injury was the defective design and 
inadequate warnings of the conveyors. See R. 336. As amply demonstrated in the facts and 
argument above, all of the evidence points to the product being defectively designed and lacking 
adequate warnings. Dr. Gill testified that the defects were the proximate cause of the accident. 
The testimony is that there were no mechanical breakdown and the equipment continued to be 
used. Dr. Gill indicated that the condition of the equipment was not relevant to the cause of the 
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accident. Defendant admitted that the equipment was too dangerous for Mr. Olmos' to operate or 
be around, even though Dr. Gill testified that it is reasonable that farm workers using potato 
conveyors could be into their seventies, and with physical disabilities, and state and federal law 
prohibits discriminating against such persons in employment. Consequently, because there is no 
genuine issue as to whether a defective design and inadequate warnings were the proximate 
cause of Mr. Olmos' injury, the District Court erred by not granting summary judgment to the 
Plaintiff. This Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment, and remand 
this matter with instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of the Plaintiff. 
D. COSTS. 
Plaintiff asserts that it be awarded its costs of appeal as a matter of right should it be 
found to be the prevailing party. I.A.R. 40. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts of this matter show that the Spudnik conveyors were defective 
in their design, and lacked adequate warnings, which defects were the proximate cause of Mr. 
Olmos' injury. It was error for the District Court to grant summary judgment to Spudnik. Based 
on the evidence before it, the District Court should have granted summary judgment to Liberty 
Northwest. This Court should reverse the District Court's entry of summary judgment, and 
remand this matter to the District Court with instructions that the District Court enter summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
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